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INTRODUCTION
Winter 2009—New Year’s Day—Russia cuts off the
gas supply to Ukraine, like flipping off a light switch. Six
days later, exports to sixteen European Union member states
are affected.1 By day seven of the crisis, supplies have been

Events Editor, University of Miami International and Comparative Law
Review, J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Miami School of Law; B.A.,
2014, University of Miami. I would like to thank Dr. Marcia Beck for her
enthusiasm and expertise and Professor Cheryl Zuckerman for her
comments and contributions throughout the drafting process. I am
grateful to the International and Comparative Law Review for their hard
work throughout this process. I would also like to thank those near and
dear to me for believing in my endeavors and encouraging me to achieve
my goals, no matter how far out they seem at times. Lastly, but most
importantly, I would like to dedicate this note to my family; I would not
be where I am or who I am without them and I would definitely not be
sitting here, writing to you. It is an honor to have you as an audience and
I hope you enjoy what has truly been one of my favorite undertakings.
1 Simon Pirani et al., The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a
comprehensive assessment, OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES 1, 4
∗

2015

OILOPOLY

259

completely cut off to Europe and Slovakia has declared a
state of emergency with dwindling gas reserves.2 Eastern
European countries including Croatia, Slovenia, and Turkey
struggle to keep their nations’ lights on.3 The crisis continues
for thirteen more days until a resolution is reached by
Ukraine signing expensive ten-year “supply and transit”
contracts with Russia in order for gas supplies to resume
into the Ukraine and European Union member states. The
end result: Ukraine’s power will stay on until its next
argument with Russia, and the match igniting the current
European energy crisis between the European Union (the
“EU”) and Russia has been lit. At the time of the cutoff,
Russia controlled two-fifths of the EU’s total natural gas
supply.4 As a result of this event, the EU realized that it
needed to find alternative sources of natural gas supplies.
This article explores the ensuing competition for gas market
access in Europe between the European Union and Russia.
The EU-Russian security dilemma is best understood
as a quest for energy security. The fundamental differences
between the EU approach and the Russian approach are the
goals and strategies. Russia maintains geopolitical strategies
in order to securitize its market while the European Union
strives for energy independence through liberal

(2009),
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/NG27TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessm
ent-JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-2009.pdf.
2 See Mark Scott, Russian Gas Crisis Seeps into Europe, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7,
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-01-07/russian-gascrisis-seeps-into-europebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-andfinancial-advice.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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institutionalism. Russia utilizes international treaties and
bilateral energy agreements for its own securitization
practices, effectively weakening the EU’s control over its
member states’ ability to contract under the Energy Charter
Treaty (“ECT”). Considering the geopolitics behind Russia’s
legal moves to secure the energy market across Europe, the
EU’s only hope to avoid Russian dominance at this stage of
the expanding petroleum industry is to secure the future of
its own pipelines to offset member countries’ need for
Russian pipelines. This article predicts that Russia and the
EU will continue the battle for striking rich pipeline deals
over the next decade as both attempt to check each other in
the energy market through incompatible legal and political
frameworks (the EU trying to institutionalize the energy
market; Russia using geopolitics to manipulate EU
institutions for its own gain), constantly undermining each
entity’s ultimate quest for energy security.
This note examines legal and extra-legal means
deployed by both the EU and Russia towards achieving their
respective goals. Part I of this note lays out the political and
legal framework, focusing on EU-Russian energy conflicts,
and explaining the relevant laws and treaties governing the
energy sector. Part II considers Russia’s current relationship
with the EU under the Energy Charter Treaty, current
Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) with EU member
states, and other relevant investment provisions. Part III
explores the current, proposed, and future gas pipeline
projects of both the EU and Russia. Lastly, Part IV considers
the legal and political ramifications for the future of the
European energy sector based on Russia’s mission to
securitize the energy market and the European Union’s
drive for gas independence.
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GROUNDWORK
A. RUSSIAN
GEOPOLITICS
INSTITUTIONALISM

V.

EUROPEAN

UNION

Russian foreign policy in the energy sector is based on
achieving geostrategic advantages.5 Conversely, the
European Union’s approach focuses on using the
institutional mechanisms such as the ECT rules and
regulations to establish the energy market, setting a uniform
method for contracting.6 Russia seeks to securitize using a
Realist, geopolitical approach while the European Union
continues to try and regulate the industry, bringing Russia
into conformity with its market principles.7 These differing
frameworks make it almost impossible to form any long
term EU-Russian energy market agreement.

In International Relations theory, Russia’s foreign policy approach
would fall under the Realist paradigm, a theoretical framework used to
explain changes in states’ behavior on the basis of geostrategic gains.
Realist states see politics as a zero-sum game. There is a finite amount of
power and a state gains security only at the expense of another state’s
loss. This will be helpful in understanding the Russian strategy in the oil
market.
6 In International Relations theory, this approach falls under the liberalinstitutionalism paradigm, an alternative theory to realism, which posits
the belief that international norms and institutions create cooperation
among states. This approach best characterizes the European Union
strategy in developing policy and resolving conflicts. The realist
paradigm is incompatible with the very nature of the European Union
because it denies the efficacy of extra-governmental bodies and
international organizations in world politics.
7 Henry Helén, The EU’s Energy Security Dilemma With Russia, 4 POLIS J. 2
(2010).
5
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1. RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS
The territory that makes up the Russian Federation
today extends across a vast amount of land, lacking easily
defensible borders, and is home to several hostile ethnic
populations that are often at odds with the centralized
government.8 Russia’s unique place on the world map—
straddling both Europe and Asia—and its diverse ethnic
enclaves, make Russian stability dependent on its ability to
balance internal and external security. The quests for
expansion and security throughout Russian and Soviet
history can all be explained in terms of securitization
practices.
a) RUSSIAN HISTORY
The Russian empire was formed after three eras of
expansion to guarantee security through buffer zones,
gaining land in the southeast to protect itself from the
Mongols, expanding to the southern territories for access to
the Caspian Sea, and lastly, conquering Ukraine and the
Baltic territories to deter western threats.9 The Soviet Union
then balanced these external security interests against a
newly created internal threat: the disgruntled, conquered
minorities. Balance was formed by the creation of a strong,

Lauren Goodrich and Marc Lanthemann, The Past, Present and Future of
Russian Energy Strategy, STRATFOR ENTERPRISES, LLC (Feb. 23, 2013),
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/past-present-and-future-russianenergy-strategy [hereinafter “Russian Energy Strategy”].
9 George Friedman, The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle,
STRATFOR
(Oct.
15,
2008),
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages/geog_4892_su
m10/Geopoliticsofrussia_stratfor.pdf.
8
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centralized government in Moscow to bring all of the ethnic
groups under one authority. The government then began
militarizing and occupying the buffer zones to control the
diverse internal neighborhood, better defend itself externally
from other great power nation threats, and last but not least,
utilize its natural resources as a leverage point against other
great powers.10
The use of natural resources (mainly oil exports) as a
leveraging tool has constituted a large part of Russia’s past
and present geopolitical practices.11 Since the 1800s, energy
has been a vital commodity for Russia’s geostrategic goals.12
During the Soviet era, energy exports accounted for half of
the government’s export revenue.13 This allowed the
government to fund its expensive militarization practices
and subsidize the high cost of transit for food to its internal
population, while also subsidizing gas prices to the eastern
block that made up buffer zones to keep the conquered
territories at bay.14 Meanwhile, Russia’s ultimate
geostrategic goal was to secure its western border and ocean
access because Russia lacked warm water ports, like the
other great power nations, that could be used to combat its
economic shortcomings for transit in a land-based empire.15

Id.
Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Due to Russia’s northern land-based territory, the Russian empire and
Soviet Union struggled to provide food to its entire populous. First, the
growing season was extremely short as the “breadbaskets” are at the
latitude equivalence of Maine in the U.S. Second, the vast territory is
lightly settled and the farmlands were great distances from urban centers
and cities, thus making timely transport problematic, especially in the
10
11
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Russia’s failure to secure timely access to the ocean and
external borders, while continuing to divert all of its internal
resources towards the government’s arms race, subsidizing
agriculture and the price of oil tanking, all led to the collapse
of the Soviet Union.16 The government could maintain the
high costs of its internal security only if it continued to
receive the high revenues relied on from exporting oil to the
West.17
As the Soviet Union began falling behind the West in
technology and resources, the oil market that the Soviet
Union heavily relied on to fund its expensive state
operations collapsed after the 1970s energy crisis, decreasing
demand for the Soviet Union’s oil.18 By the mid-1980s, the
Soviet Union tried to raise energy prices in the Baltic region
to recover some of the lost revenue and reform its market—
but it was too little, too late.19 The Union fell and the Russian
territory contracted, retreating from its western borders and
central Asia in order to re-focus its resources to regain
internal security and live to fight another day. That day
came a decade later with Vladimir Putin’s presidency in
2000.20 The energy market was first on Putin’s list to reform
by reconsolidating the energy sector under state control after

winter. Third, the cost of the transport made the food unaffordable. For
more information, see generally Friedman, supra note 9, at 6.
16 Id. at 10-11; Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8.
17 Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8. The Soviet Union was able to sell
its oil at 50% lower cost than the Middle East due to keeping labor costs
low. This gave the USSR power over its periphery while undercutting
the West. Problems would soon follow with inefficient oil production,
and the fluctuation in the market.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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two decades of market liberalization.21 As a result, the
energy sector became effectively nationalized and energy
strategy, still used for securitization practices, became
Putin’s most useful foreign policy tool.
b) RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY
The Russian government underwent a series of
restructuring in the two-and-a-half decades following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, but the securitization practices
never changed, only the audience. Under the Putin regime,
the only modification of the strategy was to become more
aggressive in utilizing its natural resources as a leveraging
tool against the East and West, to not only threaten powerful
countries such as the United States, Western European
countries, and China, but also to reestablish stability in its
periphery.22 To achieve this, Putin’s government
consolidated the oil and gas industries into three monster,
state-owned companies: Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft.23
Once Russia’s gas industry was secured, the Kremlin24 began

Id. The period immediately preceding the collapse of the Union under
the Gorbachev government, into the 1990s reign of Yeltsin, underwent a
series of energy liberalization attempts to create a market-based
economy. The energy market became even less efficient, as oligarchs
bought up the former state owned oil industries, leading to corruption
and fragmentation.
22 Id.
23 To learn more about how the Putin regime was able to swiftly and
efficiently consolidate the privatized oil industries, see KHODORKOVSKY,
http://www.khodorkovsky.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). It provides an
explanation of the breakup of YUKOS, the largest oil company in Russia
owned by billionaire Khordokovsky in 2003 due to alleged “tax fraud.”
24 “Kremlin” is a term used in place of the Russian government/former
Soviet government.
21
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aggressively negotiating supply contracts containing large
quantities at sky rocketed prices with the former Soviet
states and European countries (distinct from the EU) simply
because Russia was in the position to do so as the only
supplier.25 The 2009 crisis with Ukraine is illustrative of this
approach.
Putin’s revised energy strategy has provided Russia
with excess funds to pump into its political, military, and
economic sectors26 just as before; but high reward comes
with high risk. Over half of the Russian government’s
budget now comes from the energy sector (more than during
the Soviet era); thus, Russian stability remains tied to the
success of the gas industry.27 Putin, acutely aware of this,
has tried to shift Russian revenue-raising ventures away
from the energy market to decrease its dependency on its oil
market, but with little success. Ten years of relying on the
Gazprom monopoly has left Russia with lagging technology

See Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8; see also THE FUTURE OF
NATURAL GAS, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 147-58 (2010), available
at
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf.
The
structure of Europe’s natural gas market was shaped by the OPEC
embargo of 1973. Europe tied the price of natural gas to the price of
crude oil, which limited development of a deep and liquid spot natural
gas market. As a result, “this dependence places a high premium on
security of supply, which is reflected in the region’s dependence on longterm, relatively high-priced contracts indexed to oil.” The need for the
long-term contracts was to secure supply and accommodate for
fluctuating energy prices but oil is an imperfect index for natural gas.
The relationship between Oil and Gas will be discussed in detail in Part
III.
26 A specific example is from the early 2000s when Russia paid off its
hefty debt and added billions of dollars to a rainy-day “stabilization
fund.”
27 See Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8.
25
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(reminiscent of Soviet problems) and has made it unfriendly
toward outside investment.28 This economic vulnerability
has affected Russia’s foreign policy behavior—using energy
as a political tool—toward regional and international actors,
such as the European Union.29
Putin’s resulting foreign policy—while aimed at
restoring Russia to its previous glory based on territorial
boundaries that guarantee Russian security—seeks to use
the international institutions in place to achieve its own
ends: securing revenue from the European energy market,
encouraging bilateral treaties and agreements over EU
negotiated deals, and helping establish the rules of the game
in those deals contracted with EU institutions. Russia seeks
to “divide” Europe to “rule” the energy market and be
accepted by the international community as an effective pole
in a postmodern, multipolar world.30 This strategy plays into
Russia’s divide-and-conquer strategy, its role in
international organizations such as the WTO, and its
provisional agreement under the ECT, explained further
below. Russia’s end-goals are to use these institutions to
pursue its own unilateral interests in positioning itself to
help set the rules for these institutions.31
2. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONALISM
The eventual formation of the European Union was a
response to the Realist geopolitics that governed countries’

Id.
Id.
30 See Andrei P. Tsygankov, Preserving Influence in a Changing World, 58
PROBLEMS OF POST COMMUNISM 28, 36 (2011).
31 Id.
28
29
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past aggressions across Europe after two world wars. The
European Economic Community (EEC), founded in 1958,
was originally established to create interdependence among
European nations after WWII with the aim of avoiding
future conflicts.32 The hope was that countries that traded
together would stay together. Since its creation, the EEC
expanded both its members and policy areas, warranting a
name change in 1993 to become the European Union, an
intergovernmental economic and political partnership that
today consists of 28 partner countries.33 From the EEC’s
conception to its transformation into the large institutional
body called the EU, an institutionalist approach to energy
securitization practices has dominated, which entails
diversification of the energy markets to attain flexibility and
independence.
a) GROWTH AND DIVISION
The European Union, starting from just six member
states, expanded to over four times its original size. After
WWII and during the ensuing Cold War between the Soviet
Union and the United States, the former EEC began to
expand to include more Western European member states:
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark in the 1970s;
Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 80s; and Austria, Finland,

See generally About the EU, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abouteu/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). The original founders in
1958 for the European Economic Community were Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
33 See The EU in Brief, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basicinformation/about/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
32
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and Sweden in the 90s.34 After the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the arms race, the EU consisted of 15 members
and conducted its largest acceptance and expansion of
membership in 2004 to include more Eastern European
countries such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.35 Part of the motivation behind the large expansion
was to instill democracy and bring more of the former Soviet
states into the peaceful, civilized European Union that is
committed to democratic ideas and fair market trade
principles. The Union members in favor of expansion saw
this as an opportunity to help the newly established
democracies and countries that had undergone democratic
revolutions to solidify their commitment to democracy
through incentives to join the Union and become part of a
trade and political organization that would help their
nascent market economies and democratic political
structures.36
Expansion continued in 2007 to include Romania and
Bulgaria.37 In 2013, Croatia became the newest member.38
Both the 2004 and 2007 candidates had to undergo a series of
internal transformations of their government structures,
policies, and laws so as to align themselves with the Union

See
Countries,
EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014)
35 Id.
36
See
Enlargment,
EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
37 Countries, supra note 34.
38 Enlargment, supra note 36.
34
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prior to accession.39 The concern with accepting the newer
members from Eastern Europe is twofold: (1) fear of
deviating from the original political goals of the Western
European members, and (2) wealthier members like
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom bearing the
brunt of the costs to revitalize the new members’
underdeveloped economies.
Turkey and Ukraine also play roles in changing the
composition of the EU, specifically in terms of the discussion
below. Turkey filed an application for membership in 1987
and was declared an official candidate in 1997.40 While
negotiations began in 2005, Turkey has yet to accept the
additional protocol41 and negotiations cannot continue until
it agrees to do so. The story with Ukraine is different.
Ukraine is part of the EU’s neighborhood policy and thus
cooperates with the EU. An application has not been
accepted and Ukraine is not a candidate at this time, but the
EU’s goal is to continue to bring Ukraine closer to the EU
through support packages and assistance to aid the

European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailedcountry-information/turkey/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
40 See, e.g., Arguments For And Against EU Enlargement, DEBATING EUROPE,
http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-andagainst-eu-enlargement/#.Vk6SP9bZrdt
41 For more information on the additional protocol, see Additional Protocol
and Financial Protocol signed on November 23, 1970, annexed to the
Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic
Community and Turkey and on measures to be taken for their entry into forceFinal Act- Declarations/* Unofficial translation*/, 293 OFFICIAL J. L. 4 (Dec.
29,
1972),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01).
39
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economy, human rights, and civil society.42 The EU has not
experienced many limitations in implementing uniform
policies and expanding its areas of interest with the larger
group of members. Despite the EU’s ability to efficiently
expand its economic, monetary, and social welfare programs
in the Union, divisions between old member states with
newer eastern members, and each state’s separate political
and economic agenda, create impediments for a unified EU
front on other issues that affect several members of the
Union. This is especially true in the energy sector.
The EU members create European policies and
initiatives and implement them in their state to increase ease
of travel, trade, and welfare among states. “Rule setting is
particularly important to the EU because it lacks many other
sources of traditional power” as a supranational
organization.43 Members of the European Union are bound
by legislation from both their national parliaments and the
EU institutions. The European Union has a “single
institutional framework” consisting of seven sub-organs that
function like a state government.44 Three of these sub-organs

For more information on the neighborhood policy and partnership
with Ukraine, see European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement
Netogiations, supra note 39.
43 See Helén, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting Laffan, The European Union Polity:
A Union of Regulative, Normative and Cognitive Pillars, 8 J. OF EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 709, 711 (2001)).
44 Under Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union, the seven sub-organs are: (1) the European Parliament;
(2) the European Council; (3) the Council of Ministers; (4) the European
Commission; (5) the Court of Justice of the European Union; (6) the
European Central Bank; and (7) the Court of Auditors. See Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the European Union, art. 13, October 26, 2012,
55
O.J.
13,
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal42
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(the European Council, the European Parliament, and the
European Commission) together have power and influence
over the EU’s policy and law making.45 The European
Council (EC) consists of the heads of state from each country
and provides for the political direction of the Union as the
essential EU decision maker, negotiating and adopting new
EU legislation.46 The EC does not have the power to exercise
legislative functions.47 The European Parliament (EP)
consists of 751 representatives selected by countries that are
democratically elected to represent blocs of European
citizens.48 The European Commission (Commission), with 28
members (one from each member state), is the main
institution in the EU that has the power to draft proposals
for new European laws, take care of day-to-day business,
and implement policies.49 The Commission, in conjunction
with the Court of Justice of the EU, enforces policies and has
power to place restrictions, fines, and take legal action
against members in violation of EU laws.50
Legislative acts are formed by “ordinary legislative

content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:TOC#text
[hereinafter
“EU
Treaty”].
45
EU Institutions in Brief, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm#goto_1 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
46 See generally, Counsel of the European Union, EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/ (last Dec. 14,
2014).
47 Id.
48 See European Parliament, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/european-parliament/index_en.htm (last visited
Dec. 14, 2014).
49 See European Commission, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm
(last
visited Dec. 14, 2014).
50 Id.
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procedure” as defined by the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, which consists of joint adoption by the
Parliament and the Council of proposals initiated by the
Commission.51 There are four types of laws that govern EU
policies:
regulations,
directives,
decisions,
and
recommendations.52 Any regulation passed by the EU suborgans has general application and is binding on all member
states, any directive is binding on the members it is
addressed to but leaves the national authority the right to
choose how to implement such directive, a decision is
binding in its entirety, or if the decision is directed at certain
member states, it is binding only on those parties, and
recommendations are not binding at all.53 Member states are
required to adopt any national laws to allow implementation
of Union acts and when the laws conflict, if the Union was
within its competency to create such a law, policy, treaty,
etc., it is binding on the state.54

EU Treaty, supra note 44, at art. 16(1); EU Law, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/eu-law/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
52 EU Law, supra note 51.
53 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 55 O.J. 47 available at, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2012.326.01.0001.01.ENG
[hereafter “EU Function Treaty”].
54 For an example, see Case C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and
Daniela Bonifaci and Others v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5403. This
case involved an EC directive that would have given the claimants
guaranteed payments due to the insolvency of their employer, but Italy
had not yet implemented the directive in a timely fashion. The European
Court of Justice held that a directive is still binding on a state even if they
have not adopted implementing measures required by the directive. Italy
was thus held liable for the violation as a breach of community law and
required to provide compensation for the loss suffered by citizens of the
community.
51
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B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The development of Russia’s modern energy market
and the formation of an economically interdependent union,
the EU, has led to an inevitable clash of laws, ethics, and
political frameworks. Below are the laws and regulations
that govern the EU and Russia respectively in the energy
market. These laws and regulations that govern Russia, the
EU, and the Russian-EU relationship have often been formed
in response to actions of the other. Additionally, the rules
and laws set up by Russia, the EU, and other institutions are
further manipulated to achieve their own ends of
dominating the energy market, as illustrated in Part II.
1. THE EU ON ENERGY
The European Union and its EEC predecessor were
always concerned with establishing uniform energy security
and technology across Europe. The EU commitment to
energy technology and resources is evident through its
multiple appearances in the Treaties of the European Union.
Article 3(1)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, states
that the Union shall have exclusive competence for
establishing the “competition rules necessary for the
functioning of the internal market,” and have exclusive
competence55 over a common commercial policy under

The dichotomy between complete/exclusive or shared competence is
the power with which the EU law or regulation has over individual
member states. Complete, or exclusive competence and regulations
means that they have been established by a unanimity of members in the
Council of Ministers, that any law or regulation in that area supersedes
55
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Article (3)(1)(e).56 This Article implicitly gives the EU
competence to set the rules governing the energy market
within the Union and Article 4 explicitly puts energy within
the competence of the Union. Article 4(2)(i) gives the Union
“shared competence” over energy, even if it is not expressly
granted or referenced in Articles 3 and 6 of the treaty.57
Despite these multiple attempts by the EU to create
exclusive competence over the energy market, member
states have been unwilling to give up their national
competence over their domestic oil and gas markets in the
energy sector.
In theory, because the EU is an institution governed
by the rule of law (treaties) and has established either
exclusive competence or shared competence over certain
energy issues (through the articles mentioned above), it
should not be difficult to regulate and secure its energy
market. In practice, the venture is much harder to achieve as
the EU has failed to effectively control the energy market
and secure energy supplies for its member states. The crucial
problem limiting the EU’s ability to unify the energy market
and complete contracts lies in its inability to act as a unified
body towards the energy market. Such shortcomings can be
found in the conflicting distribution of competencies within
its own treaties, articles, and member states’ insistence on
controlling their own energy policies. On the one hand, in
the Chapter on Energy from the EU Function Treaty, Article

conflicting national laws. Shared competence means that both the EU
body and member states have competence over the area. In order for any
law or regulation to be binding on the individual countries, a unanimous
vote of the Council of Ministers, comprised of the relevant minister in
each member state, agrees to be bound by that regulation.
56 EU Function Treaty, supra note 53, at art. (3)(1)(e).
57 Id. at art. 4.
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194(1) and the beginning of Article 194(2) give the EU the
power to pass laws and create policy concerning its energy
market goals:
Article 194.
1. In the context of the establishment
and functioning of the internal market and
with regard for the need to preserve and
improve the environment, Union policy on
energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity
between Member States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy
market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in
the Union;
(c) promote energy efficiency and
energy saving and the development of new
and renewable forms of energy; and
(d) promote the interconnection of
energy networks.
2. Without prejudice to the application
of other provisions of the Treaties, the
European Parliament and the Council, acting
in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure, shall establish the measures
necessary to achieve the objectives in
paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted
after consultation of the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the
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Regions.58
On the other hand, if one reads further in Article
194(2), paragraph 2 contains a significant reservation:
Such measures shall not affect a Member
State’s right to determine the conditions for
exploiting its energy resources, its choice
between different energy sources and the
general structure of its energy supply, without
prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).59
This large reservation undermines the ability of the
EU to act as a unified body, giving the individual member
states the right to maintain sovereignty over their energy
sources and supplies. To remedy this shortcoming,
especially in terms of the threat of a Russian oil monopoly,
the EU sought to further regulate the energy market as much
as it could, creating an energy policy agreeable to all
members to protect all energy endeavors in the Union
through the Third Energy Package and Energy Charter
Treaty.
2. THIRD ENERGY PACKAGE
The EU’s attempt to securitize its gas supply to each
of its member states came in response to the disunion among
members, the repeat incidents with Ukraine and Russia, and

Id. at art. 194 (emphasis added). Article 194(1)(c) will become
important for the discussion of newer energy sources (i.e. shale gas and
fracking).
59 Id. (emphasis added).
58
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the inability to guarantee its own EU gas supplies. The EU’s
Third Energy Package came into force on March 3, 2011,
containing two directives and three regulations aimed at
unifying the EU energy market.60 The main components of
the package are concerned with unbundling the energy
market to create a single energy supply market. This means
separating the “operation of gas pipelines and electricity
networks from the business of providing gas or generating
power.”61 The Package also created the European Network
of Transmission System Operators for Gas or Electricity
(ENTSO) to facilitate cooperation among different national
energy system operators.62 A last major component is the
creation of Pan-European Network Codes and ten-year
plans to develop these networks.63 The hope was to have
electricity grids and gas pipelines linked among nations by
2014 to allow for the cheap circulation of power.64
The EU interdependence structure has created an
institutional setting to regulate the relationship among
states’ activities, but can rely only on soft power to
implement any energy policy. In addition, not only does the
institutionalization occur internally, the EU effectively
“projects onto its relations with other states the type of
interstate relations that its own members have succeeded in

Third
Energy
Package,
NATIONALGRID.COM,
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industryinformation/Europe/Third-energy-package/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015).
61 EU Moves Towards ‘Single Energy Market,’ RTE.IE (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0303/298313-eu/.
62 Third Energy Package, supra note 60.
63 Id.
64 EU Moves Towards ‘Single Energy Market, supra note 61.
60
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setting up with one another.”65 This external projection of
EU institutionalism can be seen from the EU’s attempted
partnership with Russia in the Energy Charter Treaty.
3. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY
The Energy Charter Treaty was created after the end
of the Cold War as an attempt to provide a framework for
international cooperation under the Energy Charter
declaration of December 1991.66 In 1994, the ECT and the
Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental
Aspects (PEEREA) were created to provide a binding
multilateral treaty aimed at leveling the playing field in
energy-related investment and trade.67 By December 1994,
The ECT and PEEREA were ready for signature. The ECT
and PEEREA entered into force in April 1998, after the first
thirty members ratified the treaty.68 To date, sixty-two states,
including EURATOM members, have signed the ECT.69
Russia was one of the 1994 signatories, but it never ratified

Helén, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting Dominique Finon & Catherine
Locatelli, Russian and European Gas Interdependence: Could Contractual
Trade Channel Geopolitics?, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 423, 426 (2008)).
66
See
generally
ENERGY
CHARTER,
http://www.energycharter.org/process/overview/ (last visited Jan. 9,
2015).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 ‘Updated’ Energy Charter Frequently Asked Questions, ENCHARTER.ORG
(Sep.
12,
2014),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:GPpRBw1808J:www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/UEC_FA
Q.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
65
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the treaty.70 In 2009, Russia announced its statement of intent
not to ratify the ECT.71
Article 2 of the ECT explains the purpose of the
Treaty as, “establish[ing] a legal framework in order to
promote long-term co-operation in the energy field, based
on complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance
with the objectives and principles of the Charter.”72 The idea
behind the ECT was to liberalize the energy market by
creating a multilateral investment treaty as opposed to
traditional bilateral investment treaties, discussed in further
detail below. The Treaty further makes clear that states
retain sovereignty over their energy resources, as Article
18(1) states that “[t]he Contracting Parties recognize state
sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources.
They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance
with and subject to the rules of international law.”73 This
provision guarantees protection from expropriation and
other prejudices a foreign investor may face with a less
reliable trading partner by holding them accountable in
arbitral proceedings if such a situation occurs. Parties to the
charter become bound to provide protections to these
foreign investors to help promote trade with countries.
Despite Russia’s intent not to ratify the ECT, as an initial
signatory, Russia is bound to protect an investor who is a
national of a party to the treaty until 2029 under Article

Anatole Boute, The Protection of Russian Investments in the EU Energy
Market: A Case in Support of Russia’s Ratification of the Energy Charter
Treaty, 29 ICSID REV. 525, 526 (2014).
71 Id. at 526.
72 Energy Charter Treaty, pmbl, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
73 Id. at art. 18(1).
70
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45(3)(b) of the ECT.74 Therefore, any claims by foreign
investors can be brought under the ECT against Russia until
2029, but Russia does not have the same privilege. This is
important to note for the discussion below.
4. RUSSIAN DOMESTIC LAW AND GAZPROM
The EU’s initial energy policies in the early 2000s
failed to control the energy market across Europe, vis-à-vis
its member states, giving Russia, with its centralized energy
policy, an enormous advantage in the short term. With
Putin’s rise to the presidency in 2000, came the reconsolidation of the energy sector under the Russian
government’s control. It was all part of the “Putin
Doctrine”—Putin’s commitment to reviving the economic,
political, and geostrategic position of the former Soviet
Union.75 In order to recover the economic component, the
Kremlin steadily accrued state sway over the oil and gas
industry starting with Gazprom. Gazprom is a majority-state

Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 45(3)(b). Article 45(3)(a)
states in relevant part that “any signatory may terminate its provision
application of this Treaty by written notification to the Depository of its
intention not to become a Contracting Party to the Treaty,” however,
under article 45(3)(b) “[i]n the event that a signatory terminates
provisional application under paragraph (a)… any Investments made in
its Area during such provisional application by Investors of other
signatories shall nevertheless remain in effect with respect to those
Investments for twenty years following the effective date of
termination.” Because Russia has not ratified the ECT, it is not entitled to
these same protections.
75 For more information on the Putin Doctrine, see Leon Aron, The Putin
Doctrine,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(Mar.
8,
2013),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2013-0308/putin-doctrine
74
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owned global energy company that was created in 1993,
pursuant to the Russian Government Resolution and
Presidential Decree as a Russian Joint Stock Company.76 It
was subsequently reorganized to become an open joint stock
corporation; however, the government maintains a
controlling majority of the company to coordinate its
activities with the Kremlin’s policies and goals.77 Gazprom
currently holds between 72-78% of the national output and a
monopoly over the pipelines and exports from Russia.78
The Russian state then pursued its monopoly to also
include over half of the oil industry by expanding the
majority state-owned Rosneft, Russia’s now leading
petroleum industry, by “expropriating” Russia’s former
largest privately owned oil company, YUKOS, in 2004.79 The
Russian government brought tax fraud charges against
YUKOS, bankrupting the corporation to break it apart and
then put it up for auction by the Government so that Rosneft
could acquire the main assets. Putin then appointed former
KGB officer Igor Sechin as head of the corporation.80 Despite

GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
Paolo Sorbello & Ludovico Grandi, From Concentration to Competition:
The Struggle for Power Between The Kremlin and Gazprom Through The Study
of TNK-BP and South Stream, 25 IRISH SLAVONIC STUD., 106, 109 (2013).
78 See The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE (May 29, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-politicaleconomy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/; see also GAZPROM, supra note 76.
79 The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, supra note 78.
80 Id. The Russian government achieved a monopoly through bringing
false tax fraud charges against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former
Russian businessman, oligarch, and owner of YUKOS. Khodorkovsky
was one of the wealthiest men in Russia and his company was attacked
under false auspices in order to bankrupt and break up the corporation
and offer the assets up for auction sales at cheap prices. After a series of
government actions to cover up the sale, including putting the core
76
77
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Russia’s signature on the ECT, a treaty that was designed to
prevent such expropriations, an arbitral award was not
considered or rendered until 2014—years after Russia had
successfully absorbed the former YUKOS into its own state
companies.81 This demonstrated the EU’s inability to
effectively control the energy market through 2014 and
Russia’s willingness to breach the ECT in favor of pursuing
its own short-term goals, which may have major
repercussions later.82 After 2004, Rosneft continued to
prosper and in 2012 it acquired a 100% stake in TNK-BP,
officially making it the largest publicly traded oil company
in the world by output.83 Russia’s majority state-owned oil
pipeline company, Transneft, led by another former KGB
officer, Nikolay Tokarev, completes the Kremlin’s energy
trifecta.84 As a result, the Russian energy companies
(Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft), are de facto state
controlled companies that are concerned with reasserting
Putin’s power-vertical state through using energy resources

assets of YUKOS under a front name in a local province, Rosneft was
able to make the purchase inconspicuously. For more information on the
expropriation of YUKOS and trial of Khodorkovsky, see KHODORKOVSKY,
supra note 23.
81 To see highlights and details of the arbitral decisions see Martin
Dietrich Brauch, Yukos v. Russia: Issues and Legal Reasoning Behind US $50
billion
awards,
IISD
(Sept.
4,
2014),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/09/04/yukos-v-russia-issues-and-legalreasoning-behind-us50-billion-awards/.
82 The 2014 arbitral award was unfavorable to Russia, ruled to owe tens
of billions of dollars to the original YUKOS investors that were injured
from the expropriation of YUKOS.
83 History of Rosneft, ROSNEFT, http://www.rosneft.com/about/history/
(last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
84 Transneft, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/transneft/
(last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
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as a political tool against the EU and Russia’s near abroad.
II.

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW

The Russian-EU relationship is best understood
through the concept of energy security: security of a stable
oil market (demand) for Russia and security of direct access
to oil lines (supply) to the European community.85 The
current interdependent relationship has made interaction
mandatory, but cooperation optional. The relevant laws and
regulations that govern Russia, the EU, and the Russian-EU
relationship have often been in response to the actions of the
other. Russia and the EU have a choice: to work together in
the energy market (unlikely based on their differing
motives), or to seek a competitive advantage. If the latter
strategy is adopted, one of two outcomes will likely prevail:
Russia’s monopolization of the gas market or the EU’s
reliable access to non-Russian markets.
A. RUSSIAN-EU RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE ECT
The ECT is an example of the EU’s attempt to create a
rule of law in the energy market through the provision of
legally binding protection for foreign investors. Under the
Realist paradigm, the ECT is viewed by Russia as a treaty to
secure Europe’s energy supply at the expense of Russian

Silvia Caneva, EU-Russia Energy Relations: lack of Unity in the Union,
EU-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.eir.info/2011/03/07/eu-russia-energy-relations-lack-of-unity-in-theunion/.
85
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market security.86 Russia’s subsequent geostrategic planning
for its initial signature on the ECT, and later intent not to
ratify the treaty based on its Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) with European nations, illustrates the different
foundations on which the EU-Russian energy relationship is
based.
BITs are bilateral agreements between two countries
that provide the terms and conditions upon which
investments can be made. These agreements grant protection
for investments from expropriation and unfair prejudice or
bias based on nationality. This is usually done through a
specified form of dispute resolution, either by the
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) or in accordance with the rules and
procedures of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).87 Many of the BITs
signed between Russia and other EU member states were
initiated while Russia was still legally the Soviet Union,
resulting in a lot of narrow dispute resolution clauses since
the policies of the Soviet Union were not as concerned with
foreign investor rights, as a primarily nationalized economy
with few direct foreign investments.88 The expropriation of
YUKOS is a prime example of the way Russia manipulated
its legal obligations through individual BITs to gain
complete influence and control over the oil and gas
industries in Russia.89

For a more detailed explanation, see generally Boute, supra note 70, at
526.
87 For a basic understanding of international arbitration and international
dispute resolution mechanisms, see generally JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF
ARBITRATION (Oxford University Press, 2014).
88 Boute, supra note 70, at 530-31.
89 KHODORKOVKSY, supra note 23.
86
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Today, Russia needs EU investments to modernize its
natural gas extraction technology and secure its markets,
and the EU needs Russian gas reserves to supply its power.
The interdependent trade relationship between Russia and
the EU is best shown in terms of imports and exports,
illustrated in Figure 1.1 below. Attracting foreign
investments became necessary for Russia to fund its energy
market and the ECT provided a special dispute resolution
clause for energy investments that would encourage
investment. In 2008, more than 75% of the foreign direct
investment Russia received—particularly in the energy
sector—came from the EU.90 Conversely, the EU relied on,
and still relies on, large quantities of energy from third party
states.91 For these reasons, the EU used the ECT to try to
bring Russia in line with its market principles and
institutionalize its relationship with a major gas provider.
Russia would benefit from foreign investment with its
strategic markets in the EU, mainly Germany, France, Italy,
and Spain.

Miroslav Jovanovic, EU-Russia Energy Relations: the Role of International
Law from Energy Investment and Transit Perspective, 65 INSTITUT EUROPEEN
DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE 1, 62 (2011).
91 Id. at 63.
90
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FIGURE 1.1

(The above chart indicates trade between the EU and Russia from 2013.
The EU imports 77.7% of its S3 category: mineral fuels, lubricants, and
related materials from Russia. This category is inclusive of oil and gas.
Conversely, the EU exports 47.4%, almost 50% of its machinery and
transport equipment (as indicated in category S7) which includes oil
and gas extraction technologies, pipeline equipment, and other
transport mechanisms for these types of natural resources.)92

As an initial signatory to the ECT, Russia has
provisional membership for 20 years after its statement of
intent not to ratify (until 2029).93 Provisional membership in

European Union, Trade in Goods with Russia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Aug.
27,
2014),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440
.pdf.
93 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 73, at art. 45(3).
92
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the ECT means that Russia is bound to apply investment
promotion and protection, as well as dispute settlement of
the ECT for investments within its territory from the period
of provisional application until the expiration of the 20 years
in 2029.94 This would encourage investors from within the
EU to invest in Russia’s gas market, knowing that any
investments they make in Russia from now until 2029 will be
protected. However, this protection does not extend to
investments made by Russian companies or nationals after
2009 in any of the EU nations. Why then would Russia have
signed the treaty in the first place? The answer is twofold.
First, it is possible that many of the investments
Russia sought to protect in the EU through its gas
conglomerate, Gazprom, were made prior to the 2009 cut off
date and formed part of a geostrategic move on the part of
Russia. While Russia is bound to protect European member
state investments for the 20-year period under the charter,
after these EU upstream resources95 and companies have
entered Russia and the protection expires, Russia will have
all the technology and resources it needs again. Then Russia,

Boute, supra note 70, at 534.
Upstream and downstream resources are business terms, regularly
used in the oil and gas industries. Upstream resources, in terms of the
petroleum industry, refer to locating the underwater oil reserves,
bringing oil and gas to the surface, and even processing of the raw
materials. Downstream resources, in the context of the petroleum
industry, refer to the processing of the materials collected from
extraction, i.e. oil refineries, and selling the oil and gas products to
individuals, governments, or other businesses. The entity responsible for
downstream processing has direct contact with customers, providing the
finished product. For more information, see Brian Bass, The Definitions of
“Upstream” and “Downstream” in the Production Process, CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/definitions-upstream-downstreamproduction-process-30971.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
94
95
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returning to liability only under the narrow BITs, will feel
free to expropriate some of the businesses as part of its
energy securitization strategy. Second, the refusal to ratify
could stem from the Treaty’s Transit Protocol, which would
have required Russia to agree to the principles of freedom
and transit “without distinction of the origin, destination, or
ownership of energy, and non-discriminatory pricing.”96
This would go against the nature of Russia’s securitization
strategy and practices as it would force Gazprom to give up
its physical monopoly of supply when delivering gas to
Europe and severely undercut Russia’s main revenue-raising
venture.
B. RUSSIA’S DIVIDE AND CONQUER STRATEGY: OPERATING
UNDER BIT AGREEMENTS
Russia, conscious of the EU shortcomings on
enforceability of unified energy legislation, has taken
advantage of this weakness in the institutionalism approach
(the inability to fully control individual states on a
supranational level) by further fragmenting the Union
through its refusal to cooperate under the ECT and its own
bilateral energy agreements with the major energy providers
and innovators of the EU member states. While the EU seeks
to institutionalize its relationships, individual member states
within the Union still maintain Realist goals to secure their
own energy resources, markets, and wealth like Russia. This
has made it easy for Russia to contract with individual
member states to secure separate, private gas deals on

Helén, supra note 7, at 10 (quoting AALTO & WESTPHAL, THE EURUSSIAN ENERGY DIALOGUE: EUROPE’S FUTURE ENERGY SECURITY 11
(2008)).
96
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Russian terms without unbundling, while creating
incentives for those member states to block a unified energy
market in the EU so as to keep their nation’s monopoly on
gas distribution.
Russia has established “special partners” in the EU
through private gas contracts to undercut the EU’s ability to
create an internal market. These special partners include
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.97 The energy companies
in these countries enjoy separate deals with Russia that favor
their own national energy companies, such as Germany’s
E.On Ruhrgas, France’s Gaz de France, and Italy’s ENI over
a unified energy market.98 For example, in 2005, Germany
and Russia signed a deal to create a pipeline, Nord Stream,
from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea.99 Despite Russia’s
loose BITs with members of the EU, such as Germany, the
individual countries are still willing to contract in exchange
for lucrative gas deals with terms that would economically
favor their domestic energy companies and markets.100 This
will be discussed further below, but for the purposes of the
divide-and-rule strategy, the pipeline ends in Germany,
making Germany a major hub of distribution of gas for the
rest of Europe, giving it power of distribution over the other

Helén, supra note 7, at 13.
Caneva, supra note 85.
99 See Nord Stream Gas Pipeline (NSGP), Russia-Germany, HYDROCARBONSTECHNOLOGY.COM
http://www.hydrocarbonstechnology.com/projects/negp/
100 See TILMAN DRALLE, A GLANCE INTO THE FUTURE: THE PROSPECTIVE
INVESTMENT LAW REGIME BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
23
(2013),
available
at
https://tudresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/juristische_fakultaet/jfoeffl9/g
lobaltransaxion/veroeffentlichungen/DreRePIEL_paper_0213.
97
98
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states.101 These individual gas deals provide Russia with
powerful agents in the EU (the states contracting with
Russia) to hamper the successful formation of a unified
energy policy that would restrict Russia’s ability to deliver
gas at high prices and maintain its monopoly over gas
supplies to the EU.
Not only have these partnerships undermined the
creation of an internal, unified gas market, they have also
hampered the EU’s ability to form an external energy policy
with the individual states signing bilateral deals with
Gazprom for future energy supplies. Aware of the Russian
strategy, especially after the 2009 Ukraine crisis, the EP and
EC passed a 2010 regulation to safeguard against future gas
cut offs, combating Russia’s attempt at dividing the
members by furthering the institutionalization of energy
supply.102 Regulation No. 994/2010 provides a Preventative
Action Plan and Emergency Plan to ensure that the 2009
Ukraine gas dispute does not repeat itself. Under the
regulation, there must be multiple exits for gas distribution
to other EU members and certain amounts of gas must
always be kept in oil reserves in a member state that is part
of the transit and distribution of gas.103 It further calls for
increased cooperation among certain member states in
Annex IV to ensure collective security of gas supplies.104 It is
no surprise that Germany, one of Russia’s greatest advocates
against a unified energy policy, is listed in groups needing

Caneva, supra note 85.
See generally Council Regulation 994/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 295) 1 (EU)
[hereinafter “Gas Supply Regulation”], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010R0994&from=EN.
103 Id.
104 Id.
101
102
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more intra-EU cooperation and transparency.105
C. USING OTHER INSTITUTIONS
RUSSIAN-EU POLICIES

TO

FURTHER RESPECTIVE

In addition to the legislative and contractual activities
of the EU and Russia respectively in the energy market,
Russia and the EU have further polarized their relationship
through retaliations against each entity’s disagreeable
behavior. While the EU continues to use institutions and
rules to combat Russia’s aggressive behavior toward
establishing a gas monopoly in Europe, Russia has begun
using institutions against the EU. The ability of Russia and
the EU to negotiate future energy market conditions and
regulations has continued to diminish through each side’s
attempts to gain strategic advantages over the other before
continuing gas negotiations.
1. THE EU SANCTIONS RUSSIA
UKRAINE

FOR ITS

BEHAVIOR

IN

When Russia announced its annexation of Crimea in
March of 2014, the EU attempted to use its institutional rules
against Russia to demonstrate the EU’s ability to control its
own member states and trade market. The EU refused to
recognize the annexation and placed sanctions against
Russian-turned-Crimean officials in addition to restrictive
trade conditions already in place under the Council

Id. at Annex IV - Regional Cooperation. Germany is listed in three
relationships that need improvement: (1) Germany and Poland; (2)
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; and (3)
Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
105
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Regulation of July 31, 2014.106 The EU restriction on the sale
of goods to Russia under Article 3(1) of the July Regulation
required prior authorization for the “sale, supply, transfer or
export, directly or indirectly of technologies as listed in
Annex II, whether or not originating in the Union, to any
natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia or in any
other country if such equipment or technology is for use in
Russia.”107 Annex II listed, specifically, line pipe drilling or
production platforms, oil and gas extraction tools and
machinery, making clear that EU sanctions were not targeted
only at Russia’s aggressive behavior in the Ukraine, but also
at combatting Russia’s potential to expand gas projects in the
newly annexed part of Ukraine.
If Article 3(1) did not give the impression that the EU
was targeting Russia’s oil and gas industry, Article 3(5) did
so by stating:
The competent authorities shall not grant any
authorization for any sale, supply, transfer or
export of the technologies included in Annex
II, if they have reasonable grounds to
determine that the sale, supply, transfer or
export of the technologies is for projects
pertaining to deep water oil exploration and
production, Arctic oil exploration and

Erik de Bie and Sanne Mulder, New EU Sanctions Target Crimea and
Sevestopol,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Dec.
29,
2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-eu-sanctions-targetcrimea-and-sevastopol.
107 Council Regulation 833/2014, art. 3(1), 2014 O.J. (L 229) 1, 3 (EU),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833&from=EN.
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production, or shale oil projects in Russia.108
The EU sanctions would effectively cripple Russia’s
economy, which is dependent upon the upstream resources,
previously indicated in Figure 1.1, to produce its oil and gas
products. While the EU has been weakening Russia’s market
access, including bank and loan access, it is clear the EU is
still dependent upon Russian gas and oil supplies as it did
not limit Russia’s gas exports. Such action would have
completely crippled Russia, whose largest gas export market
is the EU.109 The sanctions target Russia’s oil firms Rosneft,
Transneft, and Gazprom by limiting access to EU energy
markets, but the fact that the gas industry remains excluded
from sanctions demonstrates the EU’s inability to completely
sever ties with Russia. The sanctions fail to do two things: (1)
exercise control over its energy market, as it still relies on
Russian gas exports, and (2) make negotiations of
subsequent gas agreements amicable.
2. RUSSIA’S WTO CLAIM AGAINST THE EU
In response to the EU’s Third Energy Package that
would not allow Gazprom to have more than a 50% stake in
any energy contracts signed in EU member states, Russia
sought to utilize other international institutions for its own
agenda, using the EU’s institutionalism approach against it.
On April 30, 2014, Russia filed a request with the World
Trade Organization against the EU’s Third Energy

108
109

Id. at Annex II.
Id. at art. 3(5).

2015

OILOPOLY

295

Package.110 In its request, Russia alleged that EU
regulations—specifically, the Third Energy Package
provisions—were “inconsistent with a number of obligations
and specific commitments of the EU and its Member States
under the WTO Agreement.”111 Russia alleged that most of
the unbundling procedures of the Energy Package
constituted violations of the EU’s agreement under the
WTO, specifically, the inconsistent application of
unbundling procedures and the certification requirements
that place higher burdens on third parties and foreign
investors.112
Russia’s interest in settling the matter stemmed from
the proposed South Stream Pipeline that Russia and EU
members had begun working on, and will be examined
further in Part III. Because the Third Energy Package limits
Russia’s ability to own and operate a pipeline, the regulation
would mandate that “50 percent of the pipeline can be
operated by Russia’s Gazprom, but the other 50 percent
must be operated by a third party, a condition Russian
energy ministers do not accept” as the Russian State’s Gas
conglomerate, Gazprom, is the only company with the legal
right to export gas from Russia.113 This would mean Russia
giving up complete control of its pipeline, destroying the
potential for an independent Russian gas monopoly in
Europe, and undermining Russia’s profit incentive.

See Russia files dispute against EU over regulations in the energy sector,
WTO.ORG
(Apr.
30,
2014),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/ds476rfc_30apr14_e.h
tm.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Russia sues EU over ‘Third Energy Package’- report, RT.COM (Apr. 30,
2014), http://rt.com/business/156028-russia-sues-eu-energy/.
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RACE TO THE PIPELINE

The EU’s recent laws and regulations (the Third
Energy Package and sanctions) have weakened Russia’s
ability to completely dominate the EU’s energy market
through the government-driven Gazprom. Russia’s divideand-conquer strategy has been successfully deployed to
undercut any EU plans for gas liberalization and
independence. Both the EU and Russian attempts to control
the energy market are best illustrated through the pipelines
that have been proposed, implemented, and cancelled. The
proposed pipelines are discussed below in terms of the
respective strategies and circumstances surrounding the
success or failure of the projects, Russia’s 30-year gas deal
with China, and EU versus Russian plans moving forward.
A. THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE, NABUCCO,
STREAM

AND

SOUTH

The 2005 contract between Germany and Russia to
create the Nord Stream pipeline allowed Russia to not only
reignite a special relationship with Germany, but was also a
strategic legal agreement for Russia to begin securing its
energy market. The Nord Stream pipeline was the first direct
pipeline from Russia to the EU, bypassing other transit
countries.114 It directly linked Russia and Germany,
commercially and politically.115 Initially, the pipeline was

For a complete history and background of the planning and
construction see NORD STREAM, https://www.nord-stream.com/theproject/pipeline/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
115 It was strategically beneficial for Germany to serve as the major hub
of supply of gas to Europe, while also beneficial to Russia in maintaining
114
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viewed as increasing EU’s security of supply. The EU later
realized, after the Ukraine crisis, that this also meant an
increase in gas dependence from an untrustworthy partner:
Russia.116 This led the EU to solidify plans for an alternative
gas market and pipeline, the Nabucco pipeline. In response
to the EU’s Nabucco plan, and after successfully contracting
with Germany to construct the Nord Stream Pipeline, Russia
also launched a South Stream project between Gazprom and
the Italian ENI Company (a mixed corporation) to be
completed by 2015.117 South Stream would require a large
amount of financial backing from the energy companies and
governments, but would send gas directly to Europe,
bypassing Russia’s troublesome neighbor, Ukraine, by
routing the pipeline under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, where
the gas would reach Italy via Greece.118

EU dependence on its gas supply. Further, a political alliance between
Germany and Russia emerged from Germany’s desire to keep its
favorable pipeline contract, which brought Germany on board with
Russia’s desire to limit EU unification of a single energy market.
116 Caneva, supra note 85.
117 Id.
118 Id. The author argues that the agreements showed a tendency of the
EU countries to sign bilateral deals with Russia in line with their national
interests, regardless of the collective security concerns as members of the
EU.
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FIGURE 1.2

(This map indicates the four main European-Russian pipelines
discussed in this article: The Nord Stream Pipeline (established),
South Stream pipeline (scrapped as of December 2, 2014), the Nabucco
pipeline (scrapped in the summer of 2014), and the proposed Blue
Stream pipeline (Russian pipeline project with Turkey). Pipelines not
included in this chart are an alternative EU pipeline and the Power of
Siberia pipeline that would feed from Russia to China.)119

The South Stream pipeline would further increase EU
dependency on Russian gas exports as Russia gained

The Russia-Turkey Energy Axis: Putin has chosen the Middle East over
Europe,
GLOBAL
RESEARCH
(Dec.
4,
2014),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russia-turkey-energy-axis-putin-haschosen-the-middle-east-over-europe/5417836.
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bilateral agreements with the partially government-owned
Italian energy company and struck a huge deal with
Bulgaria and Greece to begin the project in 2012.120 The
South Stream project was designed to block any
independent EU pipeline, such as the Nabucco pipeline that
the EU had been planning for nearly a decade. South Stream
and Nabucco had similar planned pathways, as illustrated in
Figure 1.2 above. Despite the EU impression that the high
costs of building South Stream would make the project
highly improbable, it became clear to the EU that Russia was
willing to do anything to keep the government-controlled
Gazprom from having any competition, including
Nabucco.121
Russia’s second step in its divide-and-rule strategy
targeted Nabucco. The pipeline would further divert some
of Russia’s gas supply percentage to the EU. The Nabucco
pipeline became a reality in 2004, under the Austrian OMV
company, after being included in the EU Trans-European
Energy Network Program and receiving a 2003 EU Project

Parties to the intergovernmental agreements for South Stream
between 2008-2011 included the following: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Greece, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovenia. In addition, Gazprom sealed six
bilateral agreements with the national companies for cooperation on
South Stream: Serbian Srbijagas, Hungarian Development Bank MFB,
Bulgarian Energy Holding, Greek gas transmission system operator
DESFA, Austrian OMV, and Slovenian Geoplin Plinovodi. See South
Stream,
GAZPROM,
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/sout
h-stream/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
121 Judy Dempsey, Victory for Russia as the EU’s Nabucco Gas Project
Collapses,
CARNEGIE
EUR.
(July
1,
2013),
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52246.
120
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grant to provide half of the funding.122 The pipeline’s
construction was planned in two parts: the first part was
initially scheduled to be completed in 2012 (later postponed
to 2015) to deliver gas from pipelines established in Turkey
to Austria, after an intergovernmental agreement was signed
between Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey
in 2009. The second part was scheduled for completion in
2013 (postponed to 2019), to bridge the first part of the
pipeline in Turkey to Iran and Georgia.123 Russia’s second
step in securing its energy market was realized through
Russia’s state gas conglomerate, Gazprom, gaining control
over the companies that the EU sought to use as its own
transit network. First, Gazprom signed a memorandum of
understanding in 2006 with the Hungarian company, MOL
(a transit state in the Nabucco pipeline), to build a rival
pipeline to Hungary via Turkey and the Balkins.124 Second,
Gazprom signed a deal with the Austrian-led OMV, which
would allow Gazprom to have control over gas delivered to
Austria through the Nabucco pipeline.125
The combination of (1) incentives for gas companies
(OMV and MOL) to leave Nabucco for more lucrative
contracts, and (2) the main transit supplier (Azerbaijan’s
state-owned gas company) backing out due to its close
proximity to and fear of upsetting its relationship with
Russia, led to the cancellation of the Nabucco pipeline in
July 2013. At this point, it appeared as though Russia had
won a double victory over the EU through its bilateral

Nabucco
Gas
Pipeline,
HYDROCARBONS-TECHNOLOGY.COM,
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/nabuccopipeline/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
123 Id.
124 Caneva, supra note 85.
125 Id.
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agreements as (1) the EU’s only pipeline project had failed,
and (2) it secured Russia’s South Stream project. South
Stream would effectively be controlled by Russia, with 50%
of the project owned by Gazprom, 20% by Italian stateowned ENI, 15% for France’s state-owned EDF, and 15% for
Germany’s Wintershall.126 Further, each of the incorporated
joint contracts to the project gave Gazprom at least 50%
ownership.127 The project would have furthered Russia’s
securitization of the EU energy market; however, since the
onset of the construction in 2012, the EU in Brussels has
opposed the project on the basis that South Stream’s
construction is in direct violation of several EU laws and
regulations, including the Third Energy Package.128
B. THE BATTLE OF SOUTH STREAM
The legal battle in the ensuing EU-Russian pipeline
relationship and conflicting institutionalist versus realist
approach came head-to-head in the recent negotiations for

Why Putin pulled the plug on South Stream, RT (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://rt.com/business/211023-eu-south-stream-putin/.
127
See
South
Stream,
GAZPROM,
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/sout
h-stream/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). The following agreements were
made: (1) South Stream Bulgaria-Gazprom and the Bulgarian Energy
Holding each had 50% shares; (2) South Stream Serbia- Gazprom held
51% and Srbijagas held 49%; (3) South Stream Hungary- Gazprom and
Hungarian Development Bank MFB each had 50%; (4) South Stream
Slovenia-Gazprom and Plinovodi each held 50%; and (4) South Stream
Austria-Gazprom and OMV owned 50% each.
128 During the time that both the Nabucco and South Stream were in the
planning stages, the EU passed the Third Energy Package to create an
obstacle to Russia’s construction of the South Stream pipeline, which
would increase EU dependence on gas from Russia.
126
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South Stream. The EU’s response to Russia’s individual
attacks on Nabucco (including possible reasons for creating
the anti-competition laws in the energy sector) was staunch
opposition to South Stream on the basis that it competed
against Nabucco and ran contrary to the EU anticompetition laws and regulations. Russia’s intention with
South Stream was to further capitalize on the EU market
through Gazprom’s 50% stake in each of the pipelines,
maintain its ownership of the pipeline and gas travelling
through it, and limit the pipeline access to transport only
Russian gas, rather than leave the pipeline open for third
party access.129 This runs contrary to the Third Energy
Package’s requirements that a company cannot own more
than 50%, cannot own both the pipeline and the gas passing
through it, and must abide by the registration requirements
for third parties.
Beginning in 2013, the EU opposition to South Stream
had seemingly halted the project, as the EU Commission
stated the bilateral agreements for South Stream favored
Gazprom, and were in breach of EU Law.130 The EU
Commission sought to stop the project through enforcing its
laws, ultimately testing the EU’s ability to institutionalize
the energy market under its own rules. The Commission

Russia’s strategy to gain a monopoly over the South Stream supply
and transit routes was also a tool to undermine the EU’s ability to
diversify away from Russia with the Nabucco pipeline. See e.g. Russia
Tightens Grip on European Gas Supplies with Serbian Energy Pact, Stake in
Baumgarten
Hub,
IHS,
https://www.ihs.com/country-industryforecasting.html?id=106597195 (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
130 South Stream bilateral deals breach EU Law, Commission says,
EURACTIVE.COM
(Apr.
12,
2013),
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/commission-south-streamagreemen-news-532120
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sent requests to Bulgaria, Serbia, and other contracting
parties to cease work on the pipeline until the contracts were
renegotiated because they were in violation of EU law.131
The Commission articulated three concerns: (1) Russia
needed to observe the ownership unbundling rules, meaning
Gazprom could not own the production and the
transmission network at the same time; (2) third party access
to pipelines must be non-discriminatory; and (3) the tariff
structures needed to be addressed.132 Despite the EU’s
demands to renegotiate the contracts, Russia’s realist divideand-conquer strategy appeared to briefly succeed in the
spring of 2014. During this time, Bulgaria passed legislation
that freed South Stream from most EU regulations,
especially the regulation that would have forced Gazprom to
allow non-Russian gas to flow through the pipeline, by
classifying South Stream as a “gas-sea” interconnector
instead of a pipeline.133 By the summer of 2014, after
condemning the Bulgarian legislation, the EU regained
control and told Bulgaria to cease work until further
investigation of EU competition laws were conducted. When
Bulgaria refused, the EU cut off millions of Euros in regional
development funds.134
The legal battle ensued, and the EU appeared to have
enough power to block the pipeline, until Russia struck
another deal to bypass EU laws with Hungary in November

Id.
Id.
133 Jim Yardley & Jo Becker, How Putin Forged a Pipeline Deal that Derailed,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
31,
2014),
at
A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putinforged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.html?_r=0.
134 Id.
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2014.135 The Hungarian law essentially approved building
South Stream without EU permission by putting the pipeline
out of EU jurisdiction. The law would allow companies to
construct gas pipelines in Hungary even if the corporation
does not have the license to operate it.136 Therefore, the
decision of who could operate the pipeline would be left
solely up to the domestic Hungarian Energy Office.137
Hungary received a reprimand from the EU Commission,
which demanded an explanation for plans to continue South
Stream, while the EU also launched separate legal action
against Hungary for its laws restricting foreign purchase of
agricultural land.138 The battle reached its climax on
December 1, 2014, when Putin announced during his visit to
Turkey that it was scrapping South Stream for a pipeline
with Turkey.139
C. RUSSIA’S GAME CHANGING PLAY
Just when the EU thought it had finally won a legal
victory over Russia, Gazprom confirmed Russia’s decision to
abandon the South Stream pipeline project on December 9,

Hungarian Law gives green light to South Stream in defiance of EU, RT
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://rt.com/business/202171-hungary-south-streameu/.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See The bullying of Hungary—the Country that Dared to Disobey the US
and EU, RT (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.rt.com/op-edge/203151hungary-independent-politics-west/.
139 See Russia confirms decision to abandon South Stream, EURACTIVE.COM
(Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/russiaconfirms-decision-abandon-south-stream-final-310712.
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2014.140 This decision left EU members and companies at a
loss of over € 2.5 billion.141 Russia’s decision made clear that
it does not intend to contract with the EU on Europe’s terms.
Russia still seeks to manipulate the rules and laws that
govern the energy market and is unwilling to take a back
seat to the EU institutionalist rules and regulations. Thus,
Russia’s response to the EU’s delays on the South Stream
construction and increased sanctions against Russia for its
actions in Ukraine was to work with Turkey to build a
pipeline on Russian terms. Such a decision is clearly
intentional as Turkey was the original transit state picked for
the EU’s Nabucco pipeline that Russia effectively
undermined through separate bilateral agreements.
The new pipeline would effectively circumvent any
Third Energy Package regulations which South Stream
conflicted with because gas would be delivered to the EU via
the Turkey-Greece border, cutting out any EU member state
such as Bulgaria or the Ukraine. The Gazprom chief stated
that once the new Turkey pipeline becomes operational, “the
role of Ukraine as a transit country will be reduced to
zero.”142 Thus, Russia’s new project aims to demonstrate that
it does not plan to conform to the EU’s Third Energy
Package, nor blink at the sanctions the EU placed on Russia
for its activity in Ukraine. As a result, the EU again remains
vulnerable until it can acquire alternative gas access and
Russia’s full strategy becomes clear from its new plans. If
Russia can’t set the rules directly, Russia will take its ball

Id. Additionally, on December 30, 2014, Gazprom bought back the
shares of South Stream from ENI, Wintershall and EDF to gain 100%
stake in South Stream.
141 Why Putin pulled the plug on South Stream, RT (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://rt.com/business/211023-eu-south-stream-putin/.
142 See Russia confirms decision to abandon South Stream, supra note 139.
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back and go home; as illustrated by Russia’s scrapping of
South Stream. Meanwhile, Russia will continue finding
loopholes in EU laws and regulations to achieve its own
end-goals (securitizing the energy market) until Putin can
position Russia to become the umpire in the energy market.
Scrapping South Stream in favor of a Turkish pipeline is just
another strategic move by Russia to change one of its pawns
into another queen to appear stronger on the energy market
chessboard against what will be a lengthy game with the EU.
D. RUSSIA’S OTHER PROJECT: ANTI-FRACKING
2014 was a big year for Russia. In addition to the legal
battle with the EU over South Stream, a battle over shale gas
was playing out in the background between Russia and
Chevron. The American energy giant Chevron showed up in
Romania in 2013 to lease land for exploratory shale gas
drilling.143 The development of any shale gas or U.S. entry
into the European gas market would marginalize Russia’s oil
and gas prices that fund Kremlin Co., especially in countries
that are highly dependent on Russian gas.
Romania, one of these heavily dependent countries,
thought it had struck rich with Chevron’s plan to look for
shale gas, but the region quickly and mysteriously became
loud with anti-fracking144 protests, of which the Russian
government is believed to be spearheading. There has been

Andrew Higgins, Russian Money Suspected Behind Racking Protests,
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TIMES
(Dec.
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2014),
at
A6,
available
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144 “Fracking” is a term used to define the type of extraction used in shale
gas production.
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no substantial evidence of Russian involvement in the antifracking protests, but it is important to note that while antifracking protests developed in all of Russia’s near abroad
countries that are dependent on Russian oil,145 no protests
have resulted from Gazprom’s own exploration of shale gas
and oil. Additionally, Russian broadcasters were especially
interested in covering the anti-fracking protests, instilling
fear in the villagers watching in Romania, Bulgaria, and
Ukraine, that they, “along with their crops and animals,
would perish from poisoned water,” if shale exploration
expanded in their regions.146 Russia seemingly won another
victory against the EU through its divide-and-rule strategy,
nipping regional shale gas projects in Europe in the bud by
pitting the populations of eastern European states against
European development of the shale gas market.
E. LOOKING EAST
One other pipeline looms in the discussion of future
EU-Russian energy market competition: the Power of Siberia
Pipeline. In May of 2014, just after Russia sent its complaint
to the WTO regarding the EU’s prejudicial Third Energy
Package, Russia struck a large deal with China for a 30-year,
$400 billion dollar gas supply contract.147 Potential reasons
for the timing and selected partner for the project include the
EU sanctions on Russia’s energy market and Russia’s need
for a second large energy market to diversify its own

I.e. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine. See Higgins, supra note
143.
146 Id.
147 Russia signs 30-year gas deal with China, BBC NEWS (May 21, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017.
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supplies.148 The gas deal did not have the most favorable
terms as China’s president drove a hard bargain on the
prices of gas supplied by the pipeline. This could be due to
Russia’s vulnerability from a combination of EU sanctions,
falling gas prices, and a simultaneous drop in the Russian
ruble. The more likely answer is that this is another
geostrategic move by Putin to secure Russia’s long-term
energy market consumers before new developers hit the
scene, including shale gas operations.
Additionally, in November 2014, Russia and China
signed a second pipeline deal, slightly smaller than the
initial agreement, which would supply gas from western
Siberia to China.149 Russia, looking east, has turned its
attention towards China with two large gas deals to supply
almost one fifth of China’s total supply.150 This, in
combination with the Turkish pipeline in the works, plays
into Russia’s geostrategic pivot towards Asia. As a result,
Russian dependence on China will increase astronomically
in the next few years, but this may all be part of Russia’s
geostrategic plan. While Russia will remain dependent upon
China for now, because China is one of the few countries of
the world with the “financial ability and the market capacity
to consume Russia’s huge energy exports on a sustainable
basis over a long period of time,” it will enable Russia to
prove to the EU that the sanctions will not isolate Russia or
bring Russia under its institution’s rules.151 Such economic

Id.
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reliance will allow Russia to maintain a stake in the energy
market. It is unclear whether the deals with China are a
strength or weakness due to the dropping prices of gas and
oil this past year. However, for purposes of EU-Russian
relations in the energy market, Russia’s turn towards
Eurasia will continue to increase competition between the
two and likely hinder future negotiations with the EU
anytime soon to soften the Third Energy Package regulations
or sanctions against Russia’s ventures in Crimea.
IV.

A FUTURE RUSSIAN MONOPOLY?

The EU-Russian race for energy market security in
Europe entails several moving pieces. How the pieces fall
will shape the legal framework and parameters in which the
EU and Russia can contract in the energy market in the
future, if at all. Currently, EU-Russian relations hang by a
thread as the EU Institutionalist-oriented and Russian
Realist-oriented states battle over regional versus national
laws prevailing in the energy sphere, particularly concerning
the legality of the EU’s Third Energy Package. Despite
Russia’s recent actions shifting its attention away from
Europe, it has not taken its eyes off the prize: a monopoly of
the energy market in its near abroad, spanning from
Western Europe to Eurasia. Similarly, the EU has not given
up hopes for gaining energy security for its member states.
This section briefly discusses the current status of the EU
and Russia respectively, considers their current legal
oblations to each other, and then makes concluding remarks,
including a prediction and recommendation for future
energy market relations between the two.
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A. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE EU?
The scrapped South Stream project has left the EU
still dependent on Russian gas moving from Russia through
Ukraine and the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany.
However, the EU is not as vulnerable as it was when the
2009 Ukraine gas crisis occurred. The EU has taken the
necessary legal measures to ensure that each member retains
natural gas reserves in abundance so that any immediate
shut off by Russia will not affect the EU members
immediately or harshly.152 Additionally, the EU has gained
confidence from its showdown with Russia over ceasing
construction of the South Stream pipeline until Russia
conforms to EU laws: keeping member states from working
on the project despite Russian attempts to undermine the
Third Energy Package and the EU successfully sanctioning
Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea.
The EU also has other plans in the aftermath of the
scrapped South Stream pipeline, specifically a smaller
pipeline called TANAP.153 While it does not help the
countries that suffered as a result of the scrapped South
Stream like Hungary and Bulgaria, TANAP will offset some
of the EU’s dependence on Russian gas in the future.154
Despite plans to create new pipelines, the EU’s main focus
will be promoting “interconnectors” to ensure gas and
electricity flow between countries. This is a chance for the

Gas Supply Regulation, supra note 102.
The European Union heads into battle with national governments on energy,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
17,
2015),
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EU to make progress on the interconnectedness of EU
member states, which had been lagging behind EU timeline
goals, mainly due to Russian influences. The EU will not
have a problem funding new energy projects and greener
alternatives; the problem the EU faces is time.155 Lastly, the
EU, as of January 15, 2015, has been considering whether to
prosecute Gazprom for abusing the EU’s single energy
market rules by forming bilateral agreements with its
member states.156 It appears that the EU has not been broken
by Russia’s scrapping of South Stream, but has instead
found strength to reunify the union to fight new legal battles
with Russia.
B. IS RUSSIA AT A POINT OF STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS NOW?
More light will be shed on Russia’s position in the
energy market after the decisions are made concerning the
Third Energy Package from the WTO and if any softening of
relations after Crimea occur. The decision by President Putin
to scrap the South Stream project and turn to Turkey has
raised a lot of questions about the ultimate Russian strategy.
The EU claims Russia’s decision was a sign of weakness
while its economy suffers; however, Russia has portrayed
the decision to cease construction of the pipeline as a failure
of the EU to cooperate in negotiations, leading to the EU’s
own economic blunder.
The problem is that Russia cannot completely turn its
back on the EU, its largest energy export market and import
market for energy technologies. However, how far is too far?
The development of the new pipelines with Turkey and
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China, if they ever pan out, would provide Russia with a
second energy market, free from EU regulations. If South
Stream is ever revisited, the Turkish pipeline is completed,
and the energy agreements with China come to fruition,
Russia could be headed for the gas monopoly across Europe
that it has wanted all along. However, such success, if
possible, is far down the road, and Russia’s main concern
will be securing an energy market so that it can continue its
expensive foreign policy to control Ukraine and form an
energy alliance with NATO member, Turkey. Now, more
than ever, Russia’s fate will depend on its ability to
securitize a stable flow from the energy market to fulfill its
goals under the Putin regime.
C. THE
CONTINUED
RELATIONSHIP:
INTERACTION UNDER THE ECT

NECESSARY

The ECT forces Russia and the EU to maintain
relations until 2029, meaning that Russia can be held
accountable if it goes too far in its divide-and-rule strategy,
pulling a similar stunt like the YUKOS expropriation against
investors from other EU member states. The end of 2029 will
be a decisive year if Russia has managed to hold on to or
strengthen its position in the energy market. It is unclear
how Russia will behave when its contract under the ECT
expires. In order to “level the playing field between energy
producers (for instance, Russia) and consumers (for instance,
the EU), it is essential to minimize the perception of the ECT
as being biased towards consuming States.”157 Further, if the
EU is to have any chance to create the framework for the
energy market under the ECT, it is in the EU’s best interest
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to recognize Russia’s major role in the modernization of the
ECT before going into negotiations with Russia. Russia’s role
in the draft Convention on Ensuring International Energy
Security (an attempt to modernize the ECT), and Russia’s
determinative role in the development of arbitration158 in the
energy field, make clear that Russia wants an equal seat at
the table on the ECT.159 Such a strategy by the EU could
contribute “toward the creation of a genuine level playing
field between producing and consuming countries within
the framework of the ECT.”160 At the same time, the EU
needs to be cautious in its negotiating process with Russia,
as indicated by Russia’s divide-and-rule strategy that
undermined EU institutionalized energy rules and Russia’s
expropriation of YUKOS.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Russia’s actions with South Stream epitomize the
Russian divide-and-conquer strategy, using behind-thescene bilateral deals to create disunity, while simultaneously
using the laws and institutions set up by the EU against it. In
response, the EU will continue to use the available legal
institutions and rules to beat Russia’s economy down and
isolate Russia’s energy market. One thing remains clear: the
battle for gas markets is far from over, as is the EU-Russian
interaction. So long as Russia has the ability to fund its
operations in the near abroad or maintain the appearance
that it has the financial wherewithal to achieve its goals, the

YUKOS made a claim against Russia, and Russia’s Gazprom has made
an independent claim against Lithuania.
159 Boute, supra note 70, at 547.
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EU will struggle to secure its own energy market. Russia’s
Realist perspective will prevent the co-existence of the EU
and Russia in the energy sector. Meanwhile, the EU will not
allow Russia to trample on or change the rules set up by its
institutions. The incompatible frameworks the EU and
Russia operate under have led to further estranging of their
abilities to contract in the energy market.
The EU cannot beat Russia by continuing to isolate
Russia and further weaken Russia’s position in the energy
sector. It will need to greet Russia as an equal partner at the
negotiation table if it hopes to peaceably form a unified
energy market that includes Russia. Conversely, Russia’s
view of victory leaves room for only one country to be on
top: either Russia will effectively create a European gas
monopoly or Russia will bring the EU under its energy
umbrella. If Russia is unable to secure its market access
within a reasonable time span, history will repeat itself and
Russia’s gas control will implode, leaving the EU with an
opportunity to rule the energy market. Neither scenario is
likely to happen in the near future.
Russia and the EU will continue to fight for striking
rich pipeline deals over the next decade, but they will likely
be geared towards different energy markets: Russia looking
to Eurasia, while the EU returns its gaze to alternative
energy supplies and the Middle East. Despite these
diverging directions, both the EU and Russia will continue
to “check” each other in the energy market. The EU will
resume its pursuit of a uniform energy market across
Europe. Russia will continue securing more pipelines for
itself while simultaneously undermining rules of the EU
institutions to ensure that a unified European gas market is
never established unless Russia and its state conglomerate,
Gazprom, play a leading role in its creation.

